of Soviet times minimised the individual's willingness to help those beyond the immediate family. In addition, economic restraints and long working hours have served to greatly reduce the material and temporal resources individuals have available to provide support to others (Norris & Kaniasty, 1996) .
One characteristic of post-Communist Europe is a high level of psychological fatalism (European Commission, 1997; Markova et al., 1998; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) . A fatalistic outlook is one of dependency, powerlessness and isolation, and acts as an inhibitor to the development of active coping strategies, including the seeking of social support (Kobasa & Puccetti, 1983; Markova et al., 1998) . Such fatalism is likely to have originated in the dramatic historical events that have marked this region for many centuries as well as the more immediate repression of individual agency during the Communist era (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) . In Mary Douglas' typology of culture, fatalists hold a cultural bias that rationalises resignation and isolation (Dake, 1992; Douglas, 1982) , with those high on fatalism suspicious and cynical about close interactions and unwilling to develop satisfying and supportive relationships (Bandura, 1995; Dake, 1992; Hobfoll, Freedy, Lane & Geller, 1990) . Although there has been little empirical research examining the relationship between personality variables in this area, fatalistic beliefs can be conceptually contrasted with personality traits such as hardiness (Kobasa & Puccetti, 1983) optimism (Sarason, Levine, Basham & Sarason, 1983; Sumi, 1997) and internal locus of control (Lakey & Cassady, 1990; Sarason et al., 1983) , all of which have been associated with higher levels of social support. Instead, fatalists hold a constellation of cognitive beliefs or schemata which lead to perceiving another's supportive attempts as unhelpful and which enhances the recall of previous, negative or unhelpful support (Lakey & Cassady, 1996) .
Previous work in Central and Eastern Europe (Goodwin et al., 1999) has found fatalists unwilling to participate in the 'reciprocity of exchange' fundamental for the establishment of close relationships (Morton, 1978) , with fatalistic respondents in these countries reporting low rates of disclosure to friends, romantic partners and parents. The present study focuses on four countries in Eastern Europe, where we anticipate fatalism to be a widespread and salient feature of the social environment. Here we predict that those high in fatalism will perceive lower rates of social support from others.
Previous research suggests that perceived social support is an important correlate of mental health (Lakey et al, 1996) , with most studies suggesting a positive correlation between perceived support and psychological well-being (Henderson & Brown, 1988; Sarason, Sarason, & Gurung, 1997) . Currently, we know of no work specifically addressing this relationship in the context of rapidly transient social societies (such as the Former Soviet Union) but, given the elevated levels of stress in these societies, we might predict qualitative estimates of support to be a positive correlate of mental health in the countries in this study (Cohen & Wills, 1985) .
However, fatalism can be seen as a component of the broader cognitive resources that interact with perceived social support to moderate the impact of stress on health (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Lakey & Cassady, 1990) . In this study we conducted regression analyses to examine the role of fatalism as a moderator of the relationship between social support and mental health. Given that fatalists are less appropriate participants in the process of obtaining social support (Sandler & Lakey, 1982) , and that those low on optimism and social support generally report poorer psychological well-being (Sumi, 1997) , we predicted a lower correlation between social support and mental health amongst our more fatalistic respondents.
Method

Participants
The data reported in this study were collected as part of a larger study conducted in 1995 into the correlates of fatalism in the Former Soviet Union (see Goodwin & Allen, 2000, for more details). Our analysis was conducted in four countries (Russia, Georgia, Belorussia and Ukraine), chosen as theoretically similar (all had experienced a substantial period of Communist rule, ending in a relatively rapid transition to market capitalism) but also differing on significant distal variables such as economic performance and religion (Schwartz, 1997) .
Shortly before the time of our study, Brezinski (1994) divided the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into four groups: (a) countries where the transformation into a pluralist, freemarket democracy is underway and unlikely to be turned back (b) countries with optimistic prospects for the future but which are still politically and economically vulnerable (c) countries whose political and economic future will be undecided for at least the next ten years and (d) countries with a less-than-optimistic outlook for the future. All the countries in this study fall within Brezinski's third group -countries with an "undecided" future.
In total, 2672 participants participated in this study. Table 1 indicates the breakdown of sample by country and occupation. Students (48% male) had a median age of 20; Manual Workers (63% male) a median age of 40, Civil Servants (34 % male) a median age of 41, Managers (63 % male) a median age of 39 and the Retired (34 % male) a median age of 64.
Questionnaires were distributed in major cities in each of the four countries: St. Petersburg, Moscow and Tver (Russia); Tbilisi (Georgia); Kiev (Ukraine), Minsk and Gomel (Belorussia) with every attempt made to question as representative a sample as possible within the occupational categories. Hence, workers were split evenly into private and state sector workers in each country, managers were equal groups of small private businessmen and managers above supervisory level, whilst civil servants were equal groups of teachers, doctors, cultural workers (e.g., museum workers) and scientists. ** Insert table 1 about here **
Measures
In this study we employed a number of inventories all of which have previously been employed by the research team in the Former Soviet Union. In these previous investigations Fatalism, social support and mental health fatalism has proven to be a significant predictor of (poor) self-disclosure (Goodwin, 1995; Goodwin et al, 1999) , low levels of democratic participation (Goodwin & Allen, 2000) and greater exposure to radiation hazards (Allen, 1996) whilst support perception has been shown to be a significant predictor of enhanced mental health (Goodwin, 1998 ). In the current study each inventory was back-translated into the relevant local language and 'decentered' to enhance the cultural appropriateness of the scale (Werner & Campbell, 1970) . Fatalism was assessed by the use of Dake's (1992) Fatalistic Cultural Values scale (British version) which includes items such as 'I feel that life is like a lottery'. Respondents answered 10 items on 5-point scales ranging from 'very strongly disagree' to 'very strongly agree'. Social support was assessed using the Interpersonal Support Evaluation List (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983) , a widely used measure that assesses four dimensions of support. A typical item asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement "There are several people I trust to help solve my problems", with respondents indicating their answer on a four-point scale ranging from definitely false to definitely true. Following the decentering process this inventory was modified to a 20 item measure to avoid questions deemed as inappropriate for the setting whilst maintaining the four types of support included in the original ISEL. Finally, mental health was assessed using Goldberg's 28-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ: Goldberg & Hillier, 1979 ), a widely employed measure for assessing non-psychotic psychiatric disorders.
We also conducted an item-bias analysis using an extension of Cleary & Hilton's (1968) analysis of variance technique to reduce cultural bias in the items employed (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997, pp 62-68) . Scores were grouped into 10 score levels and the main effect of country and the interaction of level and country were examined for each item in the questionnaire. Non-uniform bias (where there is an interaction between score level and culture) led to the removal of two items from the fatalism scale, four from the social support scale (spread across the subscales) and eight from the mental health scale. Alpha reliabilities were reduced by the smaller scales now utilised, but were generally deemed to be acceptable (overall standardised alphas: .86 for the GHQ (ranging from .84 in Russia to .89 in Ukraine), .72 for the fatalism scale (from .57 in Ukraine to .74 in Russia) and .64 for the reduced social support inventory (from .61 in Georgia to .66 in Belorussia)). These reduced scales were then used for our further analyses.
Results
Social support and fatalism by culture and occupation Table 1 Fatalism, social support and mental health Fatalism as a moderator in the relationship between social support and mental health Fatalism was a negative correlate of both social support (r (2587) = -23. p< .001) and mental health (r (2586) = .25 p< .001) with these correlations significant in all four cultures analysed. A moderator is a variable that affects the direction or strength of the relationship between an independent variable (in our case, social support) and a dependent variable (mental health) (Baron & Kenny, 1986 , p. 1174 . To tease out the moderating impact of fatalism on social support, we conducted a test for the moderating impact of fatalism on the relationship between social support and mental health. Following the procedure for the analysis of the linear effect of a moderator (Baron & Kenny, 1986 , p. 1176 we regressed social support, fatalism, and the interaction between support and fatalism on mental health. The significant effects of the interaction of fatalism and social support, whilst controlling for fatalism and support scores, indicated a small but significant moderator effect for fatalism on the relationship between social support and mental health (Beta = .06, t =2.81, p< .005). We split our respondents into two groups -those scoring above and below the median fatalism score. The correlation between social support and mental health was r(1476) = .15 for those with lower fatalism scores, r(1328) = .06 for those who scored higher on fatalism (testing for differences between these correlations z = 2.31 p< .05) (see table 2). This suggests that social support has a smaller positive but significant impact on mental health amongst those high in fatalism. ** Insert table 2 about here **
Discussion
In this study we examined the moderating effect of fatalism on the perception of social support and mental health in four former Soviet republics. Fatalism was a significant predictor of social support and this support in turn was a significant correlate of mental health in all four cultures.
In addition, fatalism had a small but significant moderating effect on the beneficial impact of social support on mental health.
Our findings for the significant moderating role played by fatalism are consistent with an established tradition of research that places similar concepts to fatalism, such as hardiness, mastery, optimism and locus of control, as central to many of our social interactions (Bandura, 1995; Sarason et al., 1983) . Although the exact relationship between these differing concepts has been little explored, and was not a focus of our current investigation, the importance of fatalism in the perception of social support, we believe, provides new cross-cultural evidence for the role of broad efficacy expectations in the perception of a supportive environment (Kobasa & Puccetti, 1983; Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1990) . These efficacy expectations are likely to influence to whom an individual turns for support (and the appropriateness of that choice), the level at which they embrace the help given, and the trust they demonstrate towards the supportive individual (Dunkel-Schetter & Skokan, 1990; Goodwin et al., 1999) . These findings may have a number of significant implications. Whilst we cannot be sure from our cross-sectional design whether it is social support that influences mental health or vice versa (Cramer, Henderson, & Scott, 1996) probably the most valuable models here will involve reciprocal feedback loops, in which people in psychological distress maintain fatalistic viewpoints which hinder them from developing supportive (and health promoting) social relationships hence further reinforcing their fatalism (Dunkel-Schetter & Skokan, 1990; Sumi, 1997) . Fatalistic views are also likely to have a significant influence on physical as well as psychological well-being. The prevalence of widespread fatalism in the Former Soviet Union is likely to have contributed to the high levels of alcohol misuse evident in this region even before the collapse of Communism, whilst high levels of binge drinking amongst men since this transition has been a major factor in the dramatic decline in life expectancy in these countries (Bobak, McKee, Rose & Marmot, 1999 ).
There were a number of limitations to the present investigation. The present study Fatalism, social support and mental health focused on just one belief -fatalism -and its relationship with perceived social support and mental health. Further investigations might profitably include a more multi-dimensional examination of values and beliefs (Schwartz, 1997) and the development of more extensive, culture-fair instruments for the measurement of fatalism and its component factors. Given the large regional differences in socio-economic development in the countries of the FSU (modern Russia comprises nearly double the land space of the US), such work should also strive to gather data from a wider range of rural and urban locations other than those investigated in the studies described in this paper. Finally, the overall correlation between mental health and social support reported in this study was only modest in size, reflecting perhaps the potential costs of seeking or providing support during periods of psychological uncertainty and transition (Hobfoll & London, 1986) . Future work could include a more fine-tuned analysis of the costs and rewards of support reception in these transient societies, which should accompany more detailed analyses of the cultural and occupational variations in support and fatalism reported above. Such additional data collection should provide us with a more detailed insight into the way that social support operates within the ecological and social demands of each culture.
Today's inhabitants of the Former Soviet Union are faced with many difficulties. For some commentators, the adoption of a capitalist system has only served to exacerbate existing social tensions between former colleagues and friends, whilst the disappearance of a hated former Central state apparatus has undermined former alliances (cf. Popenoe, 1998) . Although seeking social support from others might seem to be essential for psychological (and physical) survival in such situations, high levels of shared distress, accompanied by persisting interpersonal hostility and social fragmentation, can act as significant disinhibitors to the provision of such aid (Hobfoll et al., 1990; Norris & Kaniasty, 1996) . In this paper we have argued that fatalism can act as a significant deterrent to the development of appropriate support networks. This fatalism is likely to form part of a wider set of negative cognitive beliefs that conspire to influence the mental well-being of the inhabitants of this region (Lakey & Cassady, 1990) . Researchers in this field need to understand the roles played by these beliefs if they are to fully comprehend the perception of support and its implications. It is only then that practitioners can be helped to develop more appropriate strategies for the utilisation of support networks in coping with these challenging social environments. 
